Stefania Vitali1, James B. Glattfelder1, and Stefano Battiston1⋆
1 Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,
⋆corresponding author, email: sbattiston@ethz.ch
Abstract
The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market com-
petition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was
no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the
architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control
held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie struc-
ture and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions.
This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for
researchers and policy makers.
1 Chair of Systems Design, ETH Zurich, Kreuzplatz 5, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland,
⋆corresponding author, email: sbattiston@ethz.ch
Abstract
The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market com-
petition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was
no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the
architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control
held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie struc-
ture and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions.
This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for
researchers and policy makers.